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SAN DIEGO GAS: PROBLEMS, PITFALLS
AND A BETTER WAY
WILLIAM B. STOEB UCK*
In the practice of medicine there is a maxim that, even if no cure
can be effected, the physician should not make the patient worse. In-
deed, the same principle governs human action generally, including
the process of judicial decision. On that principle, the Supreme
Court case of San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego'
causes concern.
Stated broadly, the question in San Diego Gas is what constitu-
tional limitations restrict a governmental entity's police power to reg-
ulate the use of privately-owned land. More specifically, at what
point, if at all, does a regulation so severely inhibit the owner's use
that a constitutional limitation is exceeded? Two amendments to the
United States Constitution, the fifth and the fourteenth, are involved.
The fifth, binding directly on the United States Government, prohib-
its a deprivation of "property, without due process of law" and re-
quires "just compensation" if "private property be taken for public
use." The fourteenth amendment, binding on the states, provides
that persons shall not be deprived of "property, without due process
of law." In addition, it has been understood since at least 1897 that
the due process clause of the fourteenth incorporates the fifth's com-
pensation requirement for a "taking" of property.2 Thus, the United
* Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle.
1. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
2. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897) (strong dictum).
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States Constitution imposes both limitations on federal and state
governments.
Of course, state constitutions generally also contain similar limita-
tions that are subject to interpretation by the courts of their states.
The Federal Constitution and subsequent interpretations by the
United States Supreme Court impose a "bottom line" on actions by
state governments and their creatures. States may, under their own
constitutions, protect property owners more fully, but they cannot
protect them less.
A third constitutional limitation, the "equal protection" clause of
the fourteenth amendment, may be invoked in some cases. Equal
protection claims involve an allegation that an offended person, land-
owner or other, has been treated discriminatorily compared with
other persons. The present discussion excludes equal protection
claims; this discussion concerns only severity of regulations.
The Court's constitutional analysis in San Diego Gas focused only
on the "taking" clause. To simplify complex facts, the power com-
pany complained that a combination of zoning and open-space regu-
lations deprived it of "all practical, beneficial or economic use" of
some 214 acres it owned and wished to develop. The case followed a
tortured course through the California courts, from the trial court up
to the state supreme court, then back to the court of appeal, from
which it came directly to the United States Supreme Court.
The court of appeal held that, no matter how severe the regulation,
the company could not have eminent domain compensation, the so-
called "inverse condemnation" remedy,' on the authority of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon.' Agins
had held that remedy was unavailable in California, but the court
had said that a very severe regulation, one that deprived an owner of
"substantially all use of his land," would be an eminent domain "tak-
ing." The court would then invalidate the regulations in a declara-
tory judgment or mandamus action.5 Therefore, the court of appeal
3. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (Cal.
App. 1978), rev'd on remand without published opinion, 4 Civ. No. 16277 (June 25,
1979).
4. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), afid, 477 U.S. 255
(1980).
5. Did the California Supreme Court's discussion of invalidity refer to the "tak-
ing" clause or the due process clause? In his dissent in San Diego Gas, Justice Bren-
nan concludes it was the due process clause. See 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1298 n.4 (1981).
This is wrong. In Agins, California said they referred to a "violation of the Fifth
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added that if the company wished to retry the case and could prove
that the regulations were so severe as to constitute a "taking," the
company might yet have them declared invalid.
In Justice Blackmun's opinion, signed by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Stevens, the Court dismissed the appeal to the
Supreme Court for want of a "final judgment or decree." Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion completed the majority, though its
reference to Justice Brennan's dissent must be considered in a mo-
ment. In effect, the majority seemed unwilling to consider the com-
pensation, or so-called "inverse condemnation," remedy6 apart from
the invalidation remedy. If that were all there were to it, San Diego
Gas would be only a case of federal procedure, a dull subject indeed.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion and the prospect that a major-
ity of the Court may agree with his views on the "taking question"
places San Diego Gas at the eye of the storm. Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, was ready to review the
California position that no land use regulation could call for compen-
sation. The dissenters were willing to sever this question from the
invalidation question because they concluded California had finally,
and erroneously, precluded compensation.
Their constitutional doctrine, stated more completely than the
Court has ever stated a police power taking doctrine, emerges as fol-
lows: 1) A land use regulation may so severely restrict a landowner
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 19, of the Califor-
nia Constitution" (California's eminent domain section). See 24 Cal. 3d at 273, 598
P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375. In the same connection they relied upon Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), a regulatory "taking" case if there is
one, and upon a quotation from P. NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1972), also
stating a "taking" theory. It is true that prior California decisions, such as HFH, Ltd.
v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), and Consoli-
dated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 638 (1962), left a lot of question about whether California was working on a due
process or "taking" theory. But not Agins; it is as clear as language can make it that
the court had a "taking" doctrine in mind. If Agins is a due process case, then New
York was right in Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976); Mahon is also a due process case. If Mahon is a
due process case, Justice Brennan's dissent is in serious trouble. We will return to this
subject later.
6. In California and among some legal writers, the phrase "inverse condemna-
tion" has come to describe the remedy of compensation for severe land-use regula-
tions. This is not a discriminating use of language. Any action in which a landowner,
as plaintiff, contends a governmental entity has a de facto exercised eminent domain
powers is an "inverse" or "reverse" condemnation action.
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as to effect a "taking" under the fifth amendment. 2) Regulations
reach that point "where the effects completely deprive the owner of
all or most of his interest in the property." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon7 was cited as the "source" of this test. 3) If a regulation
amounts to a "taking," "the government entity must pay just com-
pensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first
effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation."
In short, the dissenters would adopt the so-called "inverse condem-
nation" formula that some middle-level California decisions devel-
oped and that the California Supreme Court expressly rejected in
Agins.s Justice Brennan, viewing California's discussion of "invali-
dation" in Agins as based upon the guarantee of due process, was
critical. He saidAgins had in mind the same theory as FredF French
Investing Co. v. City of New York,9 which clearly was a due process
decision. The dissent's mischaracterization ofAgins'0 is one of the
fascinating aspects of San Diego Gas. That aspect will be discussed
later.
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion suggests a majority of the
Court subscribed to the Brennan doctrine. Though concurring that
the appeal should be dismissed for lack of an appealable judgment,
Justice Rehnquist remarked that he agreed with "much of what is
said in the dissenting opinion." One may infer that Justice Rehnquist
was attracted to the general contours of the Brennan "inverse con-
demnation" doctrine, though perhaps he wanted to reflect upon the
doctrine before committing himself.
A further complication is that Justice Stewart, who did sign the
Brennan dissent, has now retired. Justice O'Connor has replaced
him. During the time she was on the Arizona Court of Appeals, she
did not write or sign an opinion that revealed her views on any sub-
ject covered by this article." Similarly, Justice Blackmun's opinion
7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
8. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476 (Cal. App. 1978); Eldridge v. City
of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976), vacating Eldridge v. City
of Palo Alto, 124 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Cal. App. 1975); Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24
Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972) (dictum). Accord Arastra Limited Partner-
ship v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp.
1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
9. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
10. See supra note 5.
11. Justice O'Connor's name first appeared among the list ofjudges in the front of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol25/iss1/2
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for the Court did not disclose a position on the taking-"inverse con-
demnation" issue, except to remark that "the federal constitutional
aspects of that issue are not to be cast aside lightly." It thus appears
that three and probably four of the present justices agree basically
with the Brennan doctrine, and the views of the other five justices are
unknown.
Those students of the law laboring in the fields of police power,
eminent domain, and land use regulation were quick to recognize San
Diego Gas's importance. 2 It suggests the Court is, or was at the date
of the decision, tantalizingly close to a breakthrough on the question
of when or if a land use regulation is an eminent domain "taking"
and, if so, what remedy the landowner may have. Or so many think.
The second section of this article will develop the theme that, had
Justice Brennan's dissent been the Court's opinion, it would have
compounded rather than resolved fundamental problems and incon-
sistencies in the Court's previous decisions. Legal writers for some
years have generally agreed that the problems and inconsistencies do
exist.' 3
The most serious problem consists of unresolved tensions between
two Supreme Court decisions, Mugler v. Kansas in 1887,14 and Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in 1922.'5 Besides the Mugler-Mahon
problem, others lurk within Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas dissent.
All will be explored in the second section. Consequently, San Diego
600 P.2d. The index to each volume of the Pacific Reporter from 600 P.2d through
633 P.2d was searched, and any Ariz. App. decision that looked remotely relevant was
examined. That search was cross-checked by a Lexis search. Except for opinions that
were pending publication as of 24 November 1981, Justice O'Connor neither wrote
nor signed an opinion relevant to this article.
12. See, e.g, Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory
Takings," 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517 (1981); Johnson, Compensationfor Invalid
Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REV. 559 (1981); Mandelker, Land Use Takings
The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981).
13. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 236
(1973); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective.- Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Van Alystyne, Taking or Damaging
br Police Power- The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1970).
14. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
15. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Both Mahon and Mugler continue to be cited by the
Supreme Court with apparent full reliance. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
1983)
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Gas lies in an area in which guidance from the Supreme Court is
eagerly awaited.
Moreover, the Court has recently handed down several decisions in
which it might have announced a definitive police power "taking"
doctrine but did not. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 6 in 1978, involving the historic site designation of Grand Cen-
tral Station, presented the Court with an opportunity to make a de-
finitive statement. Rather, the Court, through Justice Brennan, said
it had been unable to develop "any 'set formula'" for a "taking."
The Court described at length many of its own decisions involving
land use regulations. Included were Mugler, Mahon, and numerous
other decisions that have heightened the tension between those two.
No suggestion was made that any of these were inconsistent; they
were treated as alternative approaches for particular fact patterns.
Then, instead of trying to match the right formula to Penn Central's
facts, the Court simply concluded that under none of the approaches
had Penn Central suffered a "taking." The parties' case was decided,
but little else.
Between Penn Central and San Diego Gas, several Supreme Court
"taking" decisions avoided clarifying the land use regulation "tak-
ing" issue and its relation to the law of eminent domain. The 1979
decision of Andrus v. Allard 7 held that federal statutes prohibiting
transactions in bald eagle feathers or parts were not a "taking" of the
defendants' eagle feathers. Justice Brennan's opinion contains some
passages discussing regulatory "takings," but repeats Penn Central's
theme. A year later Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith 18
held that a Florida statute that gave local courts interest earned on
certain funds deposited in their registries amounted to a "taking" of
the depositors' property. The Court said the statute was not regula-
tory but an outright appropriation. In 1979, Kaiser Aetna v. United
States'9 held that an owner of a private pond who dug a channel to
navigable waters did not open the pond to public navigation. The
case is not technically an eminent domain case, though the Court did
say that it would have been a "taking" if the public had been allowed
access.
16. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
17. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
18. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
19. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol25/iss1/2
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A gins v. City of Tiburon,20 the Supreme Court's review of the Cali-
fornia decision previously cited,2" might have become the long-
awaited definitive decision. A unanimous Court concluded that a
zoning ordinance "effects a taking" if it "denies an owner economi-
cally viable use of his land." The Court cited Penn Central as author-
ity. However, because the Court merely determined that the
ordinance on its face was not a "taking," it avoided discussing the
compensation ("inverse condemnation") remedy California rejected.
Thus, Agins reiterates the holding of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
alty Co. 22 Indeed, the Court relies upon the 1926 Euclid decision as
"the seminal decision."
San Diego Gas sparked a great deal of interest because the Court
might have made the "breakthrough." A Court that reached the
merits in Roe v. Wade23 could have done so in San Diego Gas if it
had wished. Indications are that a majority of the Court had, or had
nearly, settled their minds on Justice Brennan's formulation, which,
if adopted, would meet the definition of a "breakthrough." Lawyers
interested in land use regulation still are waiting for the shoe to drop,
but they may have to wait a while longer.24
The posture of the regulatory "taking" doctrine in the Supreme
Court may now be summarized. Since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, and continuing to the present, the Court has repeatedly said
that a land use regulation can at some point become so severe that it
constitutes an eminent domain "taking." Doubt remains as to a via-
ble judicial formula or test for determining a "taking." Indeed, be-
cause of the persistence of Mugler v. Kansas and other decisions,
there is doubt about whether the "taking" doctrine has sufficient
force to make it a significant limitation upon governmental action.
20. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
21. See supra note 3.
22. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court in both Roe and
San Diego Gas.
24. As of November 27, 1981, the Supreme Court had two applications on its
docket for October Term 1981 that could produce the regulatory "taking" issue. The
Court denied certiorari, however, for each. One, docket No. 81-404, was an appeal
from Court House Plaza Co. v. City of Palo Alto, 117 Cal. App. 3d 871, 173 Cal. Rptr.
161, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1074 (1981). The other was docket No. 81-621, a petition
for certiorari in Graham v. Estuary Prop., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), cert denied,
454 U.S. 1083 (1981). The "taking" issue seemed to be clearly presented in Graham
but not so clearly in Court House Plaza.
1983]
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Recent decisions, going back at least to Penn Central, seem to presage
a "breakthrough," in which the Court will issue a definitive statement
on the doctrine. At the same time, Penn Central and later decisions
give evidence that the justices are not ready to cast the die.
As previously observed, San Diego Gas has evoked scholarly com-
mentaries,2" as did Agins v. City of Tiburon .26 Most, though not all,
of this writing concentrated on the remedial aspects of the two cases,
the so-called "inverse condemnation" remedy versus the "invalida-
tion" remedy. No argument will be made that Justice Brennan's
compensation formula is either incorrect or inappropriate. Indeed,
if-f-a court reaches the point that it concludes a land use regula-
tion has effected a "taking," then, if the fifth amendment's compensa-
tion clause is to have any meaning, "just compensation" follows. As
Justice Brennan's dissent stated, this result "is supported by the ex-
press words and purpose of the Just Compensation Clause."27 Such
an "argument for logical symmetry of remedies in all kinds of taking
cases" has been disputed. Policy arguments have been marshalled
against the remedy, most strongly that it would have a chilling effect
on local land use planning to have the possibility of compensation
hanging over zoning and environmental regulations.29 On balance,
Justice Brennan's point seems the final word; law, constitutional or
other, is command, not just convenience. Choice of remedy is not,
however, the focus of concern in the present article.
The questions to be aired here are given secondary attention but
are critical at this time. They are anterior to questions about choice
of remedy. They are problems that have festered and been plastered
over. If the Supreme Court had, by only one more vote, adopted
Justice Brennan's opinion, the Court would have compounded and
25. See supra note 12. See also 3 WHITrIER L. REV. 547 (1981).
26. Note, Municipal Open Space Ordinance Not a "Taking" of Property: Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 13 CONN. L. REV. 167 (1980); Note, Agins v. City of Tiburon: A
Balancing Framework/or "Taking" Challenges oZoning Ordinances, 1981 DET. C.L.
REv. 179; Note, Agins v. City of Tiburon: The Case ofthe Frustrated Landowner, 13
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 157 (1979); Note, Supreme Court Falls to Reach Inverse Condemna-
tion Issues, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 172 (1981); Note, Agins v. City of Tiburon." Open
Space Zoning Prevails-Failure to Submit Master Plan Prevents a Cognizable Decrease
in Property Value, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 839 (1981); Note, Agins v. City of Tiburon:
An Aggrieved Party--Loss o/Inverse Condemnation Actions in Zoning Disputes, 7 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 457 (1980).
27. 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1304-05 (1981).




even added to the real problems that make the "taking issue"
quicksand.
That which follows will be divided into two principal sections:
First an exploration of the "pitfalls and problems" that lie within Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion; and second, "a better answer" to the whole
police power "taking" question.
I. PITFALLS AND PROBLEMS OF THE BRENNAN
OPINION: PROBLEMS WITH THE TEST FOR A
"TAKING"
A. Split between Mahon and Mugler
Justice Brennan's dissent concentrates upon the remedy for a po-
lice power "taking," whether it should be compensation or invalida-
tion. Before one can consider the remedy to give a party, one must
have determined that the party is entitled to relief of some kind.
Before a court can grant compensation or declare invalidity, it must,
if that is to be the basis for relief, first determine that a "taking" has
occurred. It is well and good to fashion the proper remedy for a "tak-
ing," but if the doctrine or test for a "taking" is wrong, unworkable,
or otherwise weak, the court has built a boat without a sail.
In a sharp departure from his recent opinion for the Court in Penn
Central," Justice Brennan moved deftly to a "set formula" for a reg-
ulatory "taking." A "taking" occurs, he said, "where the effects com-
pletely deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the
property." 3' This test, he correctly acknowledged, has its "source" in
Justice Holmes's "too far" test in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.32
Self-evidently, Justice Brennan's formulation is an attempt to put a
little flesh on the bony "too far" test.
Justice Brennan's test of a "taking" built upon Mahon is not sur-
prising. In fact, all American judicial formulas that allow for regula-
tions upon land use to constitute potential "takings" are the Mahon
test or some variant of it.33 Setting aside doctrines urged by legal
30, There is no "set formula" for a "taking" but different approaches for different
factual settings. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
31. 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1304 (1981).
32. Id at 1302. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
33. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1057, 1062-70 (1980). There are, however, doctrines proposed by legal writers that
might allow for regulatory "takings" on a non-Mahon basis. Id at 1070-79.
19831
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writers, the only two judicially created formulas to govern the police
power taking question are Mahon's or that of Mugler v. Kansas14 or
some variation of one of them.
Mugler announced that, the police power's being one thing and the
eminent domain power's being another, no exercise of the police
power is an eminent domain "taking." Mahon's doctrine, that a land
use regulation that goes "too far" in diminishing an owner's rights of
use and enjoyment is a "taking," is not the logical opposite, of course.
It is, however, certainly inconsistent. Both decisions continue to be
cited with apparent full reliance by the Supreme Court.3 6
Between the two inconsistent positions, a number of important
Supreme Court decisions align, like a suspension bridge stretched be-
tween two diverging towers. Hadacheck v. Sebastian ,3 decided be-
tween Mugler and Mahon, seems in the Mugler line, not surprisingly.
But after Mahon come a number of decisions that uphold quite se-
vere land use restrictions, whose results are easier to reconcile with
Mugler than with Mahon. Leading examples are Village of Euclid P.
Ambler Realty Co. ,38 Miller v. Schoene,39 United States v. Central Eu-
reka Mining Co. ,40 and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.4  All these
decisions were cited with approval in Penn Central,42 and, indeed,
Justice Brennan similarly cited some of them in his San Diego Gas
dissent. The fact is, Mahon itself is the only Supreme Court decision
to apply the Mahon test and to conclude that a "taking" has
occurred.
The primary problem is that the Supreme Court's own decisions
are seemingly inconsistent. This should not be confused with a prob-
lem of vagueness. That problem exists also; Mahon ' "too far" test is
vague and would be so even if Mahon were the only Supreme Court
regulatory "taking" case. That problem will be addressed in a mo-
ment. Often in the law, problems of vagueness must be tolerated to a
certain extent, as with the many judicial tests that turn on "reasona-
34. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
35. Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 1069-70.
36. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
37. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
38. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (Holmes, J. concurring).
39. 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (Holmes, J. concurring).
40. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
41. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
42. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol25/iss1/2
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bleness." Inconsistency, however, is not a quality that is consciously
sought, nor is it tolerable when it occurs inadvertently. It is not an
answer to argue that the Supreme Court, of all courts, is a Court
whose decisions implement policy rather than rules. Neither policy
nor rule can be stretched to fit poles as far apart as Mahon and
Mugler.
It is not clear how fully the Court sees the inconsistency in its deci-
sions. Penn Central may have been an attempt to reconcile the for-
mer opinions, by treating them as alternative approaches for different
factual situations. If so, between his majority opinion in Penn Cen-
tral and his dissent in San Diego Gas, Justice Brennan seems to have
abandoned the attempt, for the dissent's test for a "taking" is built
squarely upon Mahon.
Consequently, had the dissent been the Court's opinion, it would
perhaps have been "definitive" on some issues, but it would have per-
petuated the Mahon-Mugler split with yet another layer. Although
the Court maintains wide discretion, not even the Supreme Court
should work within such an inconsistency. The attempt to do so has
skewed sixty years of "taking" decisions.
A review of the decisions following Mahon, cited above, beginning
with Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., will show that the tension
between Mahon and Mugler suffuses them all. The New York Court
of Appeals tried to relieve the tension in Fred F French Investing Co.
v. City ofNew York,4" by labeling Mahon's "taking" doctrine a "met-
aphor" for a lack of due process. Justice Brennan's dissent rejects
French's attempt summarily,' but it deserves more respect, as the
most promising formula so far advanced to resolve the inconsistency.
Until resolution, there will be no such thing as a definitive Supreme
Court decision on the police power "taking" issue.
Of course the Supreme Court may continue as it has for sixty
years, reaching results in the "taking" cases on essentially a case-by-
case basis. It has that power. However, such decisions are of consti-
tutional dimensions, inescapably binding on every organ of state and
local government, every court, every landowner in the country.
In the state courts, Mahon and Mugler have produced two distinct
and contrary lines of authority. Mahon's doctrine or some variant of
it has been invoked in many cases to invalidate land use regula-
43. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 NE.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
44. 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1302 n.14 (1981).
19831
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tions.45 On the other hand is a sizable group of decisions that uphold
regulations under the Mugler doctrine that no exercise of the police
power is a "taking. 46 It is not uncommon to find inconsistent
Mahon -type and Mugler-type expressions in the decisions of a given
state,47 just as there are among the Supreme Court's own decisions.
Such inconsistency has resulted in state court decisions bouncing
about in an unpredictable pattern, like a skiff caught in a tide rip.
Surely, then, the Supreme Court should bring to an end the incon-
sistency within its own decisions. Whatever "taking" formula the
Court finally adopts, the formula must resolve the tension between
Mahon and Mugler, harmonizing them if it can, overruling one if it
must. Accordingly, to attempt to fashion a remedy for a "taking"
when we do not know what a "taking" is, is to prescribe the cure
without diagnosing the disease.
B. Vagueness of the Mahon test
Even if we assume that the Mahon doctrine, or some variant of it,
is the clear test for a police power "taking"-setting aside the incon-
sistency problem-vagueness of application is readily apparent.
Mahon, in its most definite passage, said that, "while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
45. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Maryland-Nat'l Capital
Park & Planning Comm'n v. Chadwick, 286 Md. 1, 405 A.2d 241 (1979); Aronson v.
Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964); Morris County Land & Im-
provement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963);
Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
46. See, e.g., City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th
Cir. 1969); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370
P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962); People v. Adco Advertising, 35 Cal. App. 3d 507,
110 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973); Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin, 47 Ill. 2d 323, 265
N.E.2d 640 (1970); Jameson v. St. Tammany Parish Police Jury, 225 So. 2d 720 (La.
App. 1969) (dictum); People v. Raub, 9 Mich. App. 114, 155 N.W.2d 878 (1967);
Board of Supervisors v. Abide Bros., Inc., 231 So. 2d 483 (Miss. 1970) (dictum);
Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968); Saveland
Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
47. Compare, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
598 P.2d 25 (1979) (accepting Mahon), with Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 370 P.2d 342 (1962) (rejecting Mahon).
Compare Maple Leaf Inv., Inc. v. State, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977), and
Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash.2d 203, 571 P.2d 196
(1977) ("balancing" test), with Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405,
439 P.2d 248 (1968).
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recognized as a taking."4 8 Justice Holmes's underlying concern was
that one owner should not be compelled to bear more than a tolera-
ble share of society's costs of operation. Just share is the primary
reason for imposing the compensation requirement, and for that mat-
ter the other limitations upon the exercise of eminent domain power;
that has never been doubted.49
As a pithy redaction of the just-share principle and a starting point
for further embellishment, "too far" may be reasonable enough. If
Justice Holmes intended to return to that task, he chose not to further
clarify "too far" in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 50 Even as a
workable, predictable test for the resolution of actual cases, "too far"
has a lot of obvious slippage.
To be sure, there are many legal problems, often called mixed
questions of fact and law, when courts apply a vague test of reasona-
bleness. The reasonable person test in negligence cases comes to
mind first. And, to pick an example from eminent domain law, most
courts say a landowner whose right of access to an abutting street is
diminished by the state suffers a "taking" when the diminution be-
comes unreasonable.5' In these and other cases governed by rules of
reasonableness, results are less predictable than with inflexible rules,
and the trier of fact plays a large role in the outcome. However, a
great difference, if only of degree, exists between such examples and
the police power cases. The range of factual variables is much less.
Standards of comparison are more definable.
Similarly, the negligence cases usually deal with a single act, and
the reasonable-person test refers to some external standard, though it
is only the jury's concept of how the community expected the defend-
ant to act. Also, since the defendant did not plan the negligent act,
predictability is less important than in business or property affairs.
With the street access cases the court knows how much access the
owner had before the government reduced it, the degree of reduction,
the present and potential uses of his land, and the precise impact the
reduction has on these uses.
48. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
49. See, e.g., Locke, Essay Concerning Civil Government, in LoCKE's Two TREA-
TISES OF GOVERNMENT 378-80 (P. Laslett ed. 1960); Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "'Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
50. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
51. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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In comparison, to ask whether a police power regulation has "too
far" or "unreasonably" diminished former rights of use is to drift
afloat in a foggy sea. A neutral community standard is hardly discov-
erable, for it all depends upon whether one views reasonableness
from the landowner's or the government's point of view except per-
haps in extreme cases. Unlike street access cases, land use regula-
tions have a diffuse impact on an assortment of property rights that
can only be called "use and enjoyment." How far is "too far?"
A comparison of two leading decisions illustrates the vagueness
problem. InArverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 2 New York
concluded that certain zoning prevented all feasible development of
land and in addition was a "taking." Mahon was explicitly followed.
Wisconsin, in Just v. Marinette County,53 also citing Mahon, upheld a
swampland preservation ordinance that prevented all development.
The ordinance did not go "too far," the court said, because, after all,
it allowed the owners to keep the land in its natural state.
The vagueness problem is obviously connected with the inconsis-
tency problem recently discussed. One might attempt to reconcile
Mahon and the Supreme Court's subsequent regulatory "taking" de-
cisions by saying that, considering the vagueness of the "too far" test,
the regulations in the later cases simply did not go too far. That ar-
gument does not dispose of the formulaic differences between Mahon
and Mugler and the many state decisions that adopt one or the other
of their positions. Still the argument has been made and probably is
partly what the Supreme Court had in mind when it recited "alterna-
tive" approaches in Penn Central. The problem is, even considering
only the Court's own decisions (excluding Mugler itself), one must
come pretty close to saying that no land use regulation can ever go
"too far." At least one gets close enough to that position to raise a
serious question whether such a test has probative value. If state-
court decisions like Arverne Bay and Just are also considered, the
question is hard indeed.
Many courts have tried to make the "too far" test more meaning-
ful. Arverne Bay did so by holding that zoning that prevents all feasi-
ble uses goes too far. California did so in Agins v. City of Tiburon,54
by defining "too far" as a deprivation of "substantially all use" of
52. Stoebuck, The Property Right ofAccess Versus the Power of Eminent Domain,
47 TEx. L. REv. 733, 764-65 (1969).
53. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
54. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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land. In affirming Agins, the Supreme Court said in dictum that zon-
ing effects a "taking" if it "denies an owner economically viable use
of his land."" In his San Diego Gas dissent Justice Brennan spoke of
government action "where the effects completely deprive the owner
of all or most of his interest in the property."56 This article will not
undertake the Sisyphian task of analyzing and comparing these
verbalizations, which are descriptive rather than dispositive and will
undoubtedly change with the next opinion. They do perhaps tighten
up "too far" a bit, mostly by tending to limit it to the more severe
kinds of regulatory impacts.
Probably the only completely predictable formula, other than to
say no regulation is a "taking" or all regulations are "takings," would
be one that says a regulation that causes X percentage of diminution
in value is a "taking." As far as is known, no court has attempted
this, nor would the judicial process lend itself to it. However, it ought
to be possible to introduce more predictability by isolating factors
that go into the "too far" question and addressing these separately.
As for Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas, it does little to
make the "too far" test more intelligible. If anything, the dissent's
formula strengthens the suspicion that the test may be applied so re-
strictively as to have little practical effect upon governmental actions.
The dissent, then, suffers from and perpetuates the vagueness prob-
lem that haunts Mahon's test. The "definitive" Supreme Court deci-
sion will need to address that problem.
C. The Brennan dissent fails to follow Mahon
Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas bases its test for a regu-
latory "taking" upon the "source," Mahon's "too far" test. In
Mahon, however, the remedy granted was invalidation, not the com-
pensation ("inverse condemnation") remedy that Justice Brennan
urges.
The reasoning behind the Mahon remedy, put succinctly, goes
through these steps: the Constitution requires "just compensation"
for a "taking"; the regulation in question has effected a "taking"; the
governmental entity has not offered compensation; and, because no
compensation is offered, the regulation offends the Constitution and
55. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
56. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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is void.57 Justice Brennen's reasoning goes like this: the Constitution
requires "just compensation" for a "taking"; the regulation in ques-
tion has effected a "taking"; the constitutional provision is self-exe-
cuting; therefore, compensation is triggered. Implied also is the
notion that the Constitution does not forbid "takings"; it merely re-
quires compensation. Justice Brennan offers policy arguments for the
compensation remedy. He also notes that in numerous kinds of in-
verse condemnation cases (properly so called), such as loss-of-street-
access cases, the remedy is always compensation.
Justice Brennan summarily explains the disparity between his rem-
edy and Mahon's. In a footnote58 he observes that in the "factual
posture" of the case, the Court had no occasion to, and did not, con-
sider an award of compensation. That appears to be true, but the
Court did regard it as "our duty" to consider the validity of the Penn-
sylvania statute because the parties had put that in issue. And the
Court did declare the statute void, as scores or hundreds of subse-
quent authorities have noted. The Court did not say compensation
was not required, but it did hold the statute was invalid.
The question raised at this point is not whether invalidation or
compensation is the correct or better remedy. If the writer were per-
suaded that any form of "taking" doctrine were correct for cases like
San Diego Gas and Mahon, he would be attracted to Justice Bren-
nan's compensation remedy. The question raised is what effect it
would have on Mahon's already confused status if the Brennan opin-
ion and remedy were to be adopted by the Court. The Court would
have the Mahon test for a "taking" but would have impliedly over-
ruled Mahon on the remedial aspect. It does appear feasible to sepa-
rate test from remedy; so, the problem is not as serious as other
problems with the Brennan dissent. Nevertheless, it is a problem be-
cause Mahon's status would be subjected to yet another question.
D. The Mahon test replicates the due process test
It is now time to bear down upon a matter previously mentioned
only briefly. Fred F French Investing Co. v. City ofWNvew York59 in-
volved the validity of a zoning ordinance that placed a parcel of
57. 101 S. Ct. at 1304.
58. See Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1980);
Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Chadwick, 286 Md. 1, 405 A.2d
241 (1979).
59. 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1303 n.17 (1981).
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downtown Manhattan realty in a special park district, open-space
zone. The landowner and would-be developer argued this was a
"taking," upon the authority of Arverne Bay Construction Co. v.
Thatcher, the leading New York decision just examined, and of Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. No, held the New York Court of Ap-
peals, it was not a "taking," but the ordinance was void because it
denied substantive due process. As for Mahon and,,4rverne Bay, the
court said the references in those decisions to a "taking" were a "met-
aphor" for a lack of substantive due process.6° Justice Brenian's San
Diego Gas dissent disposes of French in a couple of footnotes, saying
that it is "tampering with the express language of the opilion" to
label Mahon a due process case.6 ' The matter will not do;wn that
readily.
In the first place, it is very easy to confuse a regulatory "taking"
case with a substantive due process case, if indeed they 8.e different.
Justice Brennan does so in his dissent, more demonstrably than New
York did in French. In discussing the California Supreme Court's
decision inAgins v. City of Tiburon,62 he said that court set out a due
process test for validity of a land use regulation.63 If that is to, then
Justice Brennan must believe after all that "taking" is a "motaphor."
The California court concluded that zoning that has "deprived [an
60. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.F.2d 381 (1976).
61. For those who are fond of Fred F French, subsequent New York de~isions are
something of a disappointment. It is not that the French "takings"-dne proqess analy-
sis has been criticized but more that New York has "lost the thread." Decisions im-
mediately after French grasped its import. See, in order cited, Charles v. Diamond,
41 N.Y.2d 318, 360 N.E.2d 1295 (1977); New York Tel. Co: v. Town of North Hemp-
stead, 41 N.Y.2d 691, 363 N.E.2d 694 (1977); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977). Before long, however, several "thread
losing" symptoms began to appear. Some of the leading "ta'ng" cases were cited as
authority, such as Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121,359
N.Y.S.2d 7. 316 N.E.2d 305 (1974); Vernon Park Realty Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon,
307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954); and Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thhtcher, 278
N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). These "taking" cases were cited along With French
and Penn Central, which is consistent only if they are understood to be idue process
cases. At first that could have been so, but the latest decisions seem inadvertently to
have returned to them as authority for a "taking" analysis. The sharp 4istinction
between the "taking" and due process theories has become dullhd over a4eriod of
four or five years. See, in the order cited. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43
N.Y.2d 468, 373 N.E.2d 255 (1977); Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397 N.E.2d 1304
(1979); Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922 (1980).
62. 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1298 n.4, 1302 n.14 (1981).
63. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3'72 (1979).
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owner] of substantially all use of his land" may be invalidated in a
mandamus or declaratory judgment action on the ground that it is a
"taking." To support this conclusion, California, in some three pages
of text, cited as authority: a passage from Nichols that speaks of "ex-
ercise of the power of eminent domain;" The fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution; article I, section 19, of the California
Constitution, which is solely an eminent domain clause; and the fa-
mous passage from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that contains the
"too far" test.' 4 The language clearly states an eminent domain
ground. If 4gins contains a due process test, then Mahon most cer-
tainly does. If Mahon is a due process case, then, not only was Fred
F French right, but Justice Brennan's dissent is in serious trouble.
The source of confusion is in Mahon's "too far" test itself. It is a
replication of the test for when a regulation on property rights denies
substantive due process. The dogged refusal of most courts and writ-
ers to face up to this phenomenon is a major roadblock to solving the
"taking" dilemma. How did this occur?
According to the Supreme Court,65 the "classic statement" of the
due process rule is contained in the 1894 decision, Lawton v. Steele.66
In upholding a New York statute that authorized illegal fishing nets
to be seized, the Court applied this test: "it must appear, first that the
interests of the public . . . require such interference; and, second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and [third,] not unduly oppressive upon individuals."67
(Emphasis added.) In other words, 1) there must be a public problem
or "evil," 2) the regulation must tend to solve this problem, and 3) the
regulation must not be "unduly oppressive" upon the person
regulated.
Mahon replicates the third part of the test. No difference in appli-
cation would have been made in Lawton if the Court had said that
the regulation should not go "too far" in regulating the person. No
difference would have been made in Mahon if Justice Holmes had
said a land use regulation must not be "unduly oppressive" against
the landowner.
Lawton v. Steele remains a vigorous decision, in good standing in
64. 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1298 n.4 (1981).
65. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272-74, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 374-76 (1979). See supra note 5.
66. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
67. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
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the Supreme Court68 and cited frequently by federal and state
courts.69 It was in effect when Mahon was handed down; so, it is a
question of Mahon's replicating Lawton, not vice versa. On the face
of the language quoted above, the two tests occupy the same ground
for all practical purposes. A rhetorician might distinguish "too far"
regulations from "unduly oppressive" ones. But the practical effect
of these two tests is so similar as to lead to confusion and a blending
of eminent domain and due process. There is direct evidence that a
confusion and blending actually exist.
Justice Brennan's characterization of the California discussion in
Agins v. City of Tiburon as a due process analysis has already been
noted. That is only the latest of many instances in which "takings"
and due process have been confused. In its immediately preceding
zoning-"taking" decision, Agins v. City of Tiburon, this passage ap-
pears: "The application of a general zoning law to particular prop-
erty effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge,. . . or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land, see Penn Central Trans.
Co. v. New York City. .. .7o (Emphasis added.) The italicized
words are simply a rephrasing of the first part of Lawton v. Steele's
due process test, already quoted. Nectow v. City of Cambridge is a
zoning-due process case, as it has always been understood to be.
In Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Penn Central, he also
cited Nectow v. City of Cambridge and other due process decisions,
intermixed with "taking" cases.7 ' Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,7 2
certainly one of the leading regulatory "taking" decisions and relied
upon heavily in the Supreme Court's recent decisions, intermixes
Lawton v. Steele with Mahon and several other "taking" cases. Law-
ton is there cited as containing the "classic statement" to test when a
police power "encroachment on private interests" goes too far to be
upheld. On the critical point, defining how far is "too far," the Court
68. Id. at 137.
69. Id
70. E.g., Sisk v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 (5th Cir.
1981); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975); Perry v.
City of Chicago, 480 F. Supp. 498, 501 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
71. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
72. 438 U.S. 104, 125, 126, 127, 130 (1978). Other due process decisions included
Goneb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927), and Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300
(1920). These decisions show some blending of "taking" and due process language
but seem to be essentially due process cases.
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has many times interchanged the due process and "taking" cases and
continues to do so.
Cases are legion in which state courts strike down a land use regu-
lation on the ground that it is "arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory,
and void" or some such phrase.73 "Arbitrary" and "unreasonable"
are words associated with a lack of substantive due process. "Confis-
catory" is a synonym for "taking." "Void" is the result-and one
never knows in such decisions whether that result was based on emi-
nent domain or due process grounds, as if that did not matter.
The operation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution causesthe intermixing of eminent domain and due pro-
cess in part. As previously seen,74 the fifth amendment's "taking"
clause is binding on the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth. -In discussing fourteenth amendment due process, it is
therefore correct to say due process includes the guarantee of com-
pensation for i.-"taking." It is correct to speak of an uncompensated
"taking!' as denying due process. However-and this is where the
confusion must enter-that is not the same as saying that due process
is only the guarantee of compensation or that they are the same.
The fourteenth amendment also incorporates others of the first ten,
such as the first amendment. That does not cause the guarantee of
free speech, for instance, to lose its separate content, nor does it
prevent finding content in addition to free speech in the fourteenth.
There would be a full body of federal eminent domain law if the
fourteenth amendment did not exist; it simply would not apply to the
states. And if there were no fifth amendment, the fourteenth would
still extend the-rest of its protections. One fears, though, that phrases
such as "a 'taking' without due process" often obscure these
principles.
The courts, federal and state, confuse a regulatory "taking" with a
denial of due process. Mahon's "too far" test for a "taking" repli-
cates the "unduly oppressive" part of Lawton's test for denial of due
process. The Supreme Court and other courts have interchanged
"taking" and due process cases in defining "too far." A blending of
"taking" and due process tests recurs in state courts. The "definitive"
73. 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
74. See, e.g., Corthouts v,.Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112
(1953); LaSalle N9t'l Bank v. Town of Cook, 12 111. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957);
Kozesnik-v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957); Stevens v. Town
of Hunti#gton, 20-N.Y.2d 352, 229 N.E.2d 591, 283 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1967).
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Supreme Court regulatory "taking" case will address those problems.
Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas does not do so, but con-
tinues and further compounds the confusion.
III. WHAT OF "ECONOMIC" DUE PROCESS?
The previous analysis implicitly suggests that substantive due pro-
cess protects real property rights. For some years now, many have
professed to doubt that so-called "economic" due process survived in
Roosevelt's New Deal Court or, at most, that it retained sufficient
vigor to mean anything.7 5 As to the first parts of Lawton v. Steele's
test, whether there is a public problem of legitimate concern to the
governmental entity and whether the regulation adopted tends to
solve it, there is at least a minimal due process limitation extant.
Suppose a city council should adopt a land use restriction for the sole
purpose of punishing a political foe. Or suppose there is indeed a
serious public problem with rats and, purportedly to alleviate it, the
city forbids the keeping of cats. In the first case there is no legitimate
problem to which the council may address any ordinance; their ac-
tion might be said to be ultra vires. In the second example, there is a
problem, but, unless there are some highly unusual circumstances
that do not appear, the particular anti-cat ordinance hardly tends to
solve it. Justice Douglas's remarks in Berman v. Parker76 indicate
that, though "the role of the judiciary . . . is an extremely narrow
one," such regulations would be invalidated on due process grounds.
A footnote in Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas dissent suggests he,
too, believed a due process limitation on land use regulations existed
to that extent.77
For present purposes the most acute question is whether the third
part of Lawton's test, turning on the phrase "unduly oppressive," has
vitality in the Supreme Court. Suppose, to relieve the rat problem,
the city council's ordinance required that all buildings where rats
were known to propagate be burned down. There is a serious public
problem, and the ordinance tends to solve it, but is it "unduly oppres-
75, See supra note 2.
76. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156
(1973): Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980); McCloskey, Eco-
nomic Due Process and the Supreme Court." Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT.
REV. 34, Oakes, "Property Rights "in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REv.
583, 590-94 (1981).
77. 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
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sive" on the building owners? Discussions of due process, certainly
those by the Supreme Court, have not overtly discussed whether this
aspect of due process is to be treated differently than the other two.
Therefore, discussion of the question, perhaps even its existence, is
somewhat speculative. Indirect evidence suggests that some members
of the Court in recent years have felt that any question of "unduly
oppressive" or "too far" is solely a "taking" question and no longer a
part of due process. As just mentioned, Justice Douglas in Berman
and Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas omitted mention of this aspect
in discussions of due process, though they believed a regulation that
went "too far" was a "taking." On the other hand, Lawton v. Steele
remains. Some recent Supreme Court decisions, such as Justice
White's in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim78 and Justice Powell's in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,79 suggest Lawton's "unduly oppres-
sive" aspect of due process has not disappeared.
Currently, "economic" substantive due process may enjoy a renais-
sance in the Supreme Court. After a brief account of the flowering
and deflowering of "economic" due process, this article will then re-
view some of the recent evidences of quickening.
If Lawton v. Steele contains the classic statement, Lochner v. New
York in 190580 is regarded as the fullest bloom. There, the Supreme
Court struck down a statute limiting bakers' working hours, on the
ground that it denied bakery owners' due process. The result was not
justified on Lawton's, or any, formula basis but was simply the
Court's substitution of its policy judgment for the New York legisla-
ture's. That has been the ground of near-universal criticism in recent
times and was the basis for Justice Holmes's famous dissent. 81
The "Lochner era," when economic legislation might be over-
turned on some broad policy basis, lasted until the New Deal days.
Coppage v. Kansas,82 in 1915, struck down a statute that outlawed
"yellow dog" contracts, whereby employees would agree not to join
labor unions. In 1923, Adkins v. Children's Hospita8 3 invalidated a
law prescribing minimum wages for women. Yet, even during Loch-
78. 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1306 n.23 (1981).
79. 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (dictum).
80. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
81. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
82. "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics." Id at 75.
83. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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er's heyday, there was a cross-current in the Court. As early as
1908, Muller v. Oregon84 upheld a statute that set maximum working
hours for females in factories and laundries, "without questioning in
any respect" Lochner. Bunting v. Oregon,85 a 1917 decision, ap-
proved a statute fixing maximum male and female working hours,
without citing Lochner. By 1934, Lochner's eclipse came into view,
when the Court upheld the New York milk price control act in
Nebbia v. New York.86 The view became plainer in 1937, when West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish7 overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital.
This event may be said to mark the end of the "Lochner era."
Lochner has never been formally overruled, but remains in an
"eclipsed" status. Olsen v. Nebraska, a unanimous opinion written
by Justice Douglas in 1941, said that "notions of public policy imbed-
ded in earlier decisions of this Court" no longer had "continuing vi-
tality."88  Not only Olsen but numerous later decisions, such as
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.89 in 1955 and North Dakota State
Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder'. Drug Stores9" in 1973, illustrate the
accuracy of that statement. When economic regulations have been
involved, the post-Lochner approach has indulged in an almost un-
shakable presumption that they are addressed to a public problem
and are valid. Rhetorically, the Court has said that an economic reg-
ulation will be struck down if it has no "rational basis." Even this
strict standard has been applied so that no law is likely to violate it.9'
While economic due process has not died since the days of the
Roosevelt Court, it has been fairly dormant most of the time.
Theoretical justification for the narrow view of economic due pro-
cess is found in Justice Stone's famous footnote four in United States
v. Carolene Products Co. in 1938.92 In explaining why economic in-
terests should receive a lesser degree of due process protection than
should certain "personal" liberties, Justice Stone distinguished be-
tween those rights that are expressly mentioned in the first ten
84. 262 U.S. 525 (1923).
85. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
86. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
87. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
88. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
89 313 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941).
90. 348 US. 483 (1955).
91 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
92 McCloskey, supra note '76, at 39.
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amendments and others that are only implied. So, for instance, since
freedom of speech and press are read into the fourteenth amendment
from the express words of the first, and rights in economic relation-
ships are only implied, there is a much stronger presumption of valid-
ity of regulations of the latter than of the former. On this basis, the
"double standard," whereby first-amendment rights are given strong,
and property or economic rights weak, due process protection has
been justified.
But Phoenix rose from the ashes. In the last decade or so, Supreme
Court evidence of several kinds has appeared, suggesting that eco-
nomic due process too may be having a rebirth. None should think
that any emerging economic due process will be in the image of Loch-
ner v. New York; expecting that would construct a shibboleth. There
is, however, reason to say that Lawton v. Steele's concept of "unduly
oppressive" may again be filled with meaningful content. Of this
there is evidence.
Reference was just made to the "double standard" and to its justifi-
cation in the Carolene Products case. If the justification is genuine
and not merely a rationalization for a pre-determined result, then all
"implied" ights-all rights not specifically enumerated in the first
ten amendments-should receive the same slight due process protec-
tion that economic rights have received since the end of the Lochner
era.
The trouble is, some newly discovered implied fights have received
strong protection. A right to travel outside the country was given
broad protection in Aptheker v. Secretary of State. 93 "Certain rights
associated with the family," whose contours are undefined, were the
basis for striking down a zoning ordinance on due process grounds in
Moore v. East Cleveland.94 Most strikingly, the "penumbra" right of
"privacy" has emerged. In Griswold v. Connecticut,95 a statute
prohibiting birth control devices and instruction was invalidated as
denying this right. A primary example is Roe v. Wade,96 striking
down the Texas anti-abortion statute on the ground that it denied the
fourteenth amendment right of privacy. No one can read this deci-
sion without concluding that it gives broad meaning and strong pro-
tection to the right of privacy. Indeed, Professor John Hart Ely has
93. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
94. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
95. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
96. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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said Roe was as arbitrary as Lochner v. New York; he even finds Roe
less defensible than Lochner. 7 Has the Court come round rull circle?
Was the theoretical justification for the "double standard" only a
sand castle? If a double standard exists for economic rights, does it
exist only by arbitrary fiat? These are troublesome questions in a
system in which principles are supposed to control results.
The Court itself has been troubled by the "double standard." Jus-
tice Stewart's majority opinion in 1972 in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp. ,98 which Justice Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall signed, con-
tains a remarkable passage. The occasion was a holding that federal
district courts had jurisdiction to entertain suits challenging a state
pre-judgment garnishment in a section 1983 action.99 Under the sec-
tion, district courts might hear suits challenging state action that de-
prived persons of "rights, privileges, or immunities" guaranteed by
the United States Constitution or statutes. A district court had dis-
missed the action on the ground that the quoted phrase referred only
to "personal" and not "propcrty" rights. Reversing, the Supreme
Court said: "[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and prop-
erty rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have
rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no
less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'per-
sonal' right. . . ." This language, which reads like something out of
John Locke, was attributed to John Adams, William Blackstone, and
Locke. Here is a statement of principle to counterbalance Carolene
Products' footnote four.
In several areas, in fact, the Supreme Court has strengthened con-
stitutional protections of property rights in recent years. Lynch v.
Household Finance is one example, of course. Three years previ-
ously, the Court had struck down a Wisconsin pre-judgment garnish-
ment statute in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 'o The same year
as Lynch, Fuentes v. Shevin .. voided a state pre-judgment replevin
procedure. These due process decisions involved procedural rather
than substantive due process. That does not detract from the present
point, which is that new law was made enlarging property rights. To
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973).
99. 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
100. 42 US.C. § 1983 (1976).
101, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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be sure, "personal" property, not "commercial" property, was in-
volved. But this is not significant unless they are to be distinguished
by a second "double standard," piled on top of the "personal"
rights-property rights "double standard."
A second and quite recent augmenting of property rights has come
under the contract clause, article I, section 10, of the Constitution.
Between Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell"°2 in 1934
and City of El Paso v. Simmons 0 3 in 1965, the scope of the clause was
severely circumscribed. Its vitality was problematic, especially as ap-
plied to private obligations. But in 1977 it sprang to renewed life in
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey. °4 For the first time in nearly
forty years, a state statute, repealing an earlier law giving certain pro-
tections to holders of some public bonds, was held to violate the con-
tract clause. The next year, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus,'015 the Court took a further step. It struck down a Minne-
sota statute that added to the obligations of employers to employees
under their pension plans, which is a matter of private contract. Jus-
tices Brennan, White, and Marshall, dissenting, complained that the
majority's broad reading of the contract clause threatened "to under-
mine the jurisprudence of property rights developed over the last 40
years."10
6
The Supreme Court's newly enlarged first-amendment-due-process
protection of commercial speech is another enhancement of property
rights. Since Valentine v. Chrestensen 107 in 1942, it had been assumed
that at least certain kinds of commercial speech, most of all advertis-
ing, were beyond the first amendment's scope. Some uneasy distinc-
tions had been made, for instance, in the "pornography" cases
involving publication of books and movies for profit' 08 and for news-
papers.'09 Then, in the mid-1970's, the advertising citadel crumbled
under sudden attack. Bigelow v. Virginia," in 1975, extended the
102. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
103. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
104. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
105. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
106. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
107. Id at 259.
108. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
109. See Schad v. Village of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (nude dancing), and
cases cited therein.
110. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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first and fourteenth amendments' protection to a newspaper adver-
tisement for abortions. The next year Virginia Pharmacy Board v.
Virginia Consumer Council"' did the same for prescription drug ad-
vertisements, in an opinion that went further than Bigelow. And, the
next year, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona" 2 struck down a state rule
against lawyers' advertising. That commercial, for-profit advertising
is protected is clear, though the extent of protection is not. The
Supreme Court's most recent advertising-free-speech decision, Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,' ' shows that non-commercial
communication has a preferred status to commercial and that the
area of law is in a state of flux. Strong cross currents are at work
within the Court, as witnessed by remarks in Justice White's plurality
opinion in Metromedia, in which he suggests that Chief Justice Bur-
ger's dissent would have required the Court to overrule certain free-
speech decisions.1 4 Overall, the past five or six years have seen com-
mercial or economic rights strengthened in the free-speech area.
To recapitulate, economic rights have ascended in the Supreme
Court in several areas within the past few years. The "double stan-
dard" between economic rights and "personal" liberties, while not
disappearing, has lost much of its vigor and legitimacy. Due process
protection has been extended to economic interests in pre-judgment
garnishment and replevin cases as well as commercial speech cases.
The contract clause has been resuscitated. However, such tangible
items of evidence are not the whole story; they are symptoms of
changes in the Court's composition and thinking that will in the long
run determine its directions.
Historical evidence confirms what common knowledge tells us-
that members of the Court who would be classified as political and
social conservatives tend to defend economic and property rights,
and socio-political liberals tend to restrict such rights. Liberals tend
to enlarge "personal" liberties, while conservatives tend to give less
weight to these liberties when they collide with other societal inter-
ests, such as stability, order, and also economic rights. The Court
that handed down Lochner v. New York was dominated by conserva-
tives. When President Roosevelt's liberal appointees made their
weight felt, the Lochner era ended, and economic rights weighed
111. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
112. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
113 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
114. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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lighter in the balance. Through the years of the Warren Court, that
continued to be the story. It is not just coincidence that a renaissance
of property rights has occurred, because there has been a historic shift
from the composition of the Warren Court to that of the Burger
Court. The situation, however, is more complex than that; as sug-
gested above, there are some interesting cross currents.
In Virginia Pharmacy Board, for instance, Justice Rehnquist, who
might be supposed to favor economic interests, dissented to the ex-
tension of free-speech protection to the advertising of prescription
drugs." 5 His dissent suggests that his objections to extending first-
amendment protection and to interfering with a state's legislative
choices were stronger than whatever concern he felt for the pharmacy
business. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stevens,
dissenting in the Metromedia case, indicate that similar objections
overcame any concern they had for protecting the billboard advertis-
ing business." 6 Fuentes v. Shevin is an unusual case from a proprie-
tary viewpoint, in that the conditional seller of goods had a property
interest in replevying them speedily, and the buyer had an interest in
delaying replevin. Justice White's dissent, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun joined, saw the seller's interest as
weighing heavier than the buye1s7 Justices White, Stewart and
Rehnquist, dissenting in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, were con-
cerned with giving due process protection to the "extended family"
and with interference with local legislative powers."8 The above ex-
amples illustrate that justices who might in general tend to favor pro-
tection of property rights may, in a given case, find that tendency
overcome by stronger countervailing value judgments. On the other
hand, in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey"9 and Allied Struc-
tural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,2 the decisions that revived the contract
clause, there are strong dissents by Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall that clearly show an ideological objection to an expansion
of property rights. One suspects that a decision that invalidated a
115. Id at 517-20.
116. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 781-90
(1976).
117. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
118. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97-103 (1972).
119. 431 U.S. 494, 531-52 (1977).
120. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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land use regulation on property-rights-due-process grounds would
evoke a similar dissent.
Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas'' contains an interest-
ing byplay that may be relevant at this point. As already seen, he
mischaracterized California's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon 2 '
as a due process decision, when the California Supreme Court explic-
itly stated a "taking" theory.'23 Why? The answer may be connected
with the fact that he was also quite critical ofAgins, as well as of Fred
F French Investing Co. v. City of New York,' 2 4 which clearly was a
due process decision. Is it not plausible that Justice Brennan, who
decried the enhancement of property rights in the United States Trust
and Spannaus contract-clause cases, was moving to forestall a revival
of economic substantive due process? One might ask why, if he were
supposedly concerned about a growing strength of property rights, he
would be willing to protect them under the "taking" clause, but not
under the due process clause. A possible answer is that the due pro-
cess clause has a much broader sweep than the "taking" clause. For
practical purposes the regulatory "taking" cases are limited to land
use regulations, while the due process clause applies, to the extent it
applies at all, to economic and property rights generally. If the spec-
ulations in this paragraph-and they are no more than that-are not
too wide of the mark, large forces may be gathering in the Supreme
Court upon the battleground of economic due process.
Economic and proprietary substantive due process remains a sim-
mering issue in the Supreme Court. That the Court might revive
such due process in some meaningful form, unthinkable ten or fifteen
years ago, is quite possible now. Property and economic rights have
been enlarged within that time, sometimes dramatically. The
"double standard" that purportedly distinguished due process protec-
tion of "personal" and economic rights is largely undercut. Because
individual justices weigh and balance different values and concerns
that may conflict, the degree to which economic due process may be
extended within a given case will somewhat depend upon the other
issues, such as free speech, it presents. It happens, however, that land
use regulation cases tend to present property rights questions in isola-
tion. Therefore, in such a due process case the justices will tend to
121 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
122 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
123. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
124. See supra notes 5 & 63-65 and accompanying text.
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line up according to their convictions on the role of property rights,
similarly to the recent contract-clause cases. A conservative shift in
the Court's membership suggests that, for the near future, a revival of
economic due process is increasingly likely.
What form would due process protection against land use regula-
tions take? Few persons would, or would wish to, contend for a re-
turn to Lochner v. New York or anything like it. One of the "cross
currents" in recent decisions, described above, suggests that the more
conservative justices would not countenance that degree of interfer-
ence with legislative prerogatives.
The most promising formula is to agree with New York in Fred F
French, that Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon's25 use of the word
"taking" was a "metaphor" for denial of substantive due process. It
has been shown that Mahon's "too far" test was a replication of the
final part of Lawton v. Steele's1 26 due process test.' 27 This step would
salvage the essence of Mahon without overruling it, would give due
weight to Lawton, and would resolve any confusion that exists be-
tween the two. Whether the Court chose the "too far" language of
Mahon or Lawton's "unduly oppressive" formulation would not
much matter. The same step would also largely resolve the "tension"
that exists between Mahon and Mugler v. Kansas2 and a number of
other Supreme Court decisions on the "taking" issue.' 29 Mahon
would now deal with the due process clause, and Mugler, the "tak-
ing" clause. Some further work should be done on the "taking" is-
sue, as will be discussed in a moment. If this single step were now
taken, the serious theoretical problems and conflicts that have
plagued the regulatory "taking"-due process area for sixty years
would be mostly resolved. The pieces would fit.
If the Supreme Court will choose the suggested course, it should
see to one further matter. The "too far" or "unduly oppressive" test,
whether viewed as a "taking" or due process test, is inherently vague.
It is arguably broad enough to include cases as divergent as Lochner
v. New York and Hadacheck v. Sebastian.'3 ° To be sure, the Court
125. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
126. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
127. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
128. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
129. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).




has historically preferred to maintain great breadth in its doctrinal
formulas, to retain flexibility to give play to policy considerations in
future cases. Even so, the phrase "too far," standing alone, has
proved unmanageable, as the Court's own decisions show. More-
over, since the test, being of constitutional dimensions, is binding on
the state courts that do not have the Supreme Court's flexibility, the
test should be further refined for their sake.
"Too far" or "unduly oppressive" implies a balancing of the pub-
lic's interests against those of the regulated landowner and is another
reason the question is more properly a due process than an eminent
domain one. Eminent domain should not, and generally does not,
involve balancing the condemnee's rights against the public's. For
instance, if the government occupies private land, it does not matter
whether the purpose is to build essential fortifications or only a
nonessential park; we do not weigh the public's need against the own-
er's activities or loss. For either purpose, a "taking" has equally oc-
curred, and the owner gets equal compensation.
The Supreme Court must identify factors on both sides of the
equation that are relevant to whether a land use regulation poses a
question of due process. On the public's side, the seriousness of a
public problem, the extent to which the owner's land contributes to it,
the degree to which the proposed regulation solves it, and the feasi-
bility of less oppressive solutions seem relevant. Any suggestion that
public officials had ulterior motives should make the regulation sus-
pect. On the owner's side, the amount and percentage of value loss
are of course relevant; as are questions of extent of remaining uses;
past, present, and potential uses; temporary or permanent nature of
the regulation; the extent to which the owner should have anticipated
such a regulation; and how feasible it is for him to alter present or
currently planned uses. The factors listed are not intended to be ex-
clusive; no doubt others may be identified. No list of factors can re-
duce the matter to a mathematical formula. In its usual way, the
Supreme Court would likely identify and give content to factors over
time in a number of decisions.
The Court should make land use regulations subject to the due
process limitation. The first step is to establish a basic test, built upon
Mahon's "too far," or Lawton's "unduly oppressive," formula. Then
the test can be given usable content. Hopefully, if this task is pursued
diligently, a concept of due process will evolve that is meaningful but
will not in any sense be a return to Lochner. A presumption of legis-
lative validity should be present; one need not borrow from the "sus-
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pect classification" cases. A middle ground is possible. Recent
developments in the Supreme Court indicate that this is an attainable
goal and a propitious time.
IV. FATE OF THE "TAKING QUESTION
If Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon is recast as a due process deci-
sion, as urged above, then the Supreme Court will have no police
power "taking" doctrine left. In fact, all decisions, state or federal,
that allow for land use regulations to be "takings" employ Mahon's
"too far" test or some variant of it. 3 ' Would there then be no such
thing as a "taking" by land use regulation?
Since 1962, when Professor Allison Dunham published an article
on the issue,' 32 the subject of police power, or regulatory, "takings"
has increasingly excited legal scholars. 133 The subject has become
the most urgent part of eminent domain law. Land use regulations
are environmental regulations, whether cast in the traditional form of
zoning or in some newer form such as wetlands preservation acts.
Enormous forces and high emotions surround the clash of those who
would intensify land development and those who would preserve
land in its natural state. Developers seek constitutional limitations
on environmental controls, which are generally expressed in either a
"taking" or a due process argument. Having discussed the due pro-
cess question, this article now turns to the "taking" issue.
The "taking" argument begins with the eminent domain clause of
the United States Constitution or of a state constitution. 3 4 In lan-
131. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
132. Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 1062-70.
133. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective.: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63.
134. Leading writings on the subject, in chronological order, include: Sax, Tak-
ings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Michelman, Properv, Utilit, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Van Alystyne, Taking or Damaging by, Police Power. The
Searchfor Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970); Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CAL-
LIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); Costonis, "'Fair" Compensation and the
Accommodation Power: Antidotesfor the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975); Berger, TheAccommodation Power in Land Use Con-
troversies: A Repiy to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUm. L. REV. 798 (1976); and
Hagman, Compensable Regulation: A Way of Dealing with Wipeouts from Land Use
Controls?, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 45 (1976). The writer's own views on the subject are
spelled out at length in Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH.
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guage that is typical, the United States fifth amendment says, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion." Analysis in eminent domain cases breaks down into four cate-
gories, suggested by the language of that clause: "property,"
"taking," "public use," and "just compensation."
The present concern is not with the so-called "public use" ques-
tion, which has to do with whether a governmental entity may em-
ploy its eminent domain power for a given purpose.13 5 Nor is the
concern here with "just compensation," which has to do with the
amount of compensation or damages the governmental entity must
pay, assuming it is agreed that a "taking" has occurred. Rather, the
concern is with whether any "taking" has occurred: when, if ever,
does a land use regulation come to a "taking"? "Property" and "tak-
ing" are intertwined and indeed are lumped together in many judicial
decisions and even in scholarly discussions. Precise analysis requires
that the elements be separated as far as can be.
When the "property" element is considered separately from the
"taking" element, it appears that something the law calls "property"
is "affected" by the activities of an entity that has eminent domain
power (for short, a "governmental entity"). Once, until perhaps the
latter part of the nineteenth century, it might have been said that no
"taking" could occur without some physical invasion or touching of
the condemnee's land. "Property" was equated with physical posses-
sion.1 36 Despite an occasional judicial relapse, 137 that is no longer
& LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980), and, more briefly, in W. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY
TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 6, at 167-202 (1977). Theoretical underpinnings
of the water's views are in Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH.
L REV. 553 (1972).
135. Every state constitution except North Carolina's contains an eminent domain
clause that, for present purposes, may be said to read similarly to the fifth amendment
to the United States Constitution. Stoebuck,-4 General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47
WASH. L. REV. 553, 554 (1972). North Carolina's constitution contains the so-called
"Magna Carta," or due process formulation, which states that "No person ought to be
* .depnved of his life, liberty or property but by the law of the land." This has been
interpreted to guarantee compensation for an eminent domain "taking." See Note,
Eminent Domain in North Carolina-4 Case Study, 35 N.C.L. REV. 296, 299-300
(1957).
136. See Stoebuck, A General Theory ofEminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553,
588-99 (1972); Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An 4dvance
Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
137. See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 417 (1823); Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101 (Pa. 1843). See generaly Stoebuck, .4
General Theor qf Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 599-605 (1972).
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true. In eminent domain, as in property law generally, "property" is
now recognized to refer to abstract legal rights in land. Thus, it is
quite possible to have a "taking" of "property" without any physical
invasion. Frequent examples are found in the many decisions that
hold that governmental activity that unreasonably diminishes the
right of an abutting landowner to reach a public street is a compensa-
ble "taking." The property right affected is the owner's judicially rec-
ognized easement of egress and ingress.138 Or suppose that the owner
of parcelA is benefited by a restrictive convenant that nearby parcel
B will be used for no purpose other than a single-family dwelling. If
a governmental entity acquires parcel B and uses it for some other
purpose, most courts that have faced the question have held this to
extinguish, and so to "take," owner A "property" in the restrictive
covenant. 39 As a final example, suppose a governmental entity con-
ducts some disturbing activity that, if conducted by a private party,
would amount to a nuisance against a landowner. The cases have
often involved sewage disposal plants or, in recent years, jet aircraft
approaching a public airport that fly alongside (but not necessarily
over) the plaintiffs land. In these cases most, but not all, courts have
held the plaintiff has suffered a loss, and so a "taking," of the prop-
erty right to be free from nuisance. 40
When the principles implied by the above examples, and others
that could be described are applied to the land use regulation cases, it
is apparent that "property" is "affected." Certainly the landowner's
use and enjoyment of land is a property right, actually a collection of
a more or less indefinite group of sticks in the bundle that comprise
"property." Any regulation that regulates at all will to some degree
diminish some of these rights. Thus, any such regulation "affects"
"property."
The "taking" question is much more difficult and crucial in the
present inquiry than is the "property" question. It is at this juncture
that the theory being propounded here differs fundamentally and
radically from most thinking on the police power "taking" problem.
As seen previously, all judicial theories, and much of the scholarly
138. E.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963).
139, See Stoebuck, The Property Right of ,4ccess Versus the Power of Eminent Do-
main, 47 TEx. L. REv. 733 (1969).
140. See Stoebuck, Condemnation of Rights the Condemnee Holds in Lands of An-
other, 56 IOWA L. REv. 293, 301-10 (1970).
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writing, that allow for regulations to become takings follow or are
variations upon Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 4 I Mahon's thesis is
that it is only a matter of degree whether a regulation comes to a
"taking." There is no qualitative difference between a regulation that
"affects" and a regulation that "takes" "property," only a matter of
severity or degree. The central thesis in the present article is that
there is a principled, qualitative difference between the operation of
regulations that are and those that are not "takings."
About Mahon, about the decisions influenced by it, and about the
literature on police power "takings," there is a phenomenon that
seems strangely to have escaped notice. The subject is not treated as
if it were a part of the general subject of eminent domain. On the
"taking" question, no one seems to look to other kinds of "taking"
cases, enormous in number and variety, to discover what are the
quintessential qualities or elements that mark governmental action as
a "taking." It should be self-evident, unless Mahon and its progeny
mean something else when they speak of the fifth amendment's emi-
nent domain clause, that common "taking" elements will be found,
as common chemical elements are found in the planets of the solar
system. On this premise, the "taking" mechanism as it operates in
several representative situations that are clear eminent domain exam-
ples will now be analyzed.
Consider first the simple example of a physical, or appropriative,
"taking" for some governmental project such as a building or a street.
In the one case government acquires an estate, probably in fee, and in
the other, likely an easement. The particular nature of the interests is
not important for present purposes; what is important is to inquire
into how the "taking" occurs. They key is "acquires": the owner
loses and government "takes" by acquiring. In the language of prop-
erty law, there is a transfer, by force of the judicial condemnation
decree. A deed given and received in voluntary settlement would
have been, and commonly is, a perfect equivalent.
Does the transfer principle operate in other less "physical" exer-
cises of eminent domain? It does, but as examples become less
"physical," transfers occur more subtly. Reconsider the three exam-
ples that were used a moment ago to examine the "property" ques-
tion. In the first case, loss of a street access easement, the owner's
land loses an easement, and the servient tenement, the government's
141. See Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance. The Airport Cases in Retrospect
and Prospect, 71 DICK. L. REv. 207 (1967).
1983]
Washington University Open Scholarship
38 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 25:3
street, is unburdened. A transfer, in substance the release of an ease-
ment, has occurred; a release deed would have been a perfect substi-
tute. The second case, extinction of an owner's restrictive covenant
that formerly burdened the government's land, is no different. A re-
lease of the restriction has been compelled, for which a deed of re-
lease would have accomplished the same end. The third example, in
which a governmental entity, such as an airport or sewage disposal
plant, causes nuisance-type interference involves a transfer at the
most abstract level of all. The landowner's property right to be free
from nuisance has been partially destroyed, and the government's
property rights in its airport or sewage disposal plant land have been
correspondingly augmented.
Another analysis also supports the thesis that no act of eminent
domain may occur unless there is a transfer. Interpretation of a stat-
ute or constitution begins with an analysis of the meaning of the
words used-call it linguistic analysis. In question here is the mean-
ing of the word "taken." The dictionary discusses the verb "take" for
over a page of small print. Especially when it is used in the transitive
form, the word always suggests a quality of reciprocity, in which one
party relinquishes and the other gains something.'42 Again, in the
language of property law, "taking" suggests a transfer.
To recapitulate the preceding few pages, these conclusions emerge:
First, for a "taking" of "property" to occur, action by a governmental
entity must "affect" a private owner's "property" rights. Second, not
only must the action "affect" the owner's rights, but a transfer must
occur, whereby the owner loses property rights and the governmental
entity must gain corresponding property rights. Since the regulations
being discussed are on the use of land, the property rights affected,
lost, and gained must be real property rights. These principles are
derived both from the manner in which eminent domain actually
works in all cases other than the regulatory cases and from an analy-
sis of the words of the typical constitutional eminent domain clause.
How do these principles apply when one asks if a land use regula-
tion is a "taking"? "Private property" is "affected"; this has already
been established. More, the regulated owner loses property rights;
his quantum of "property" is not merely affected but diminished. At
this point one encounters a fundamental postulate of property law.
The Anglo-American legal system does not admit that property rights
142. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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in land can be destroyed; unlike chattels, land cannot become
unowned. Rights in land may be divided up or transferred or both,
but they cannot simply disappear. This means that when a land use
regulation diminishes one owner's rights, as it will if it inhibits his
uses or potential uses in any degree, those lost rights must be ac-
counted for elsewhere. Something must move to another landowner,
either the very thing lost or the equivalent reciprocal gain in rights to
the other. All land use regulations produce transfers.
Land use regulations operate similarly to private restrictive cove-
nants. There is a restricted, burdened, or regulated parcel, and, if the
restriction has the effect of benefiting it, also a benefited parcel. The
restricted owner's rights are diminished, while the benefited owner's
rights are augmented. At a fairly high level of abstraction, a transfer
occurs. In actual practice most land use regulations cover all parcels
in a certain area or zone, so that they are more analogous to the re-
ciprocal private restrictions in a subdivision than to a restriction be-
tween only two neighbors. This complicates the burden-benefit
transfer, because all owners in the district gain and lose in varying
degrees, but it does not change the core proposition that regulations
cause transfers from burdened to benefited parcels.
Not aH such transfers, however, are to the regulating governmental
entity. A "taking" occurs only when governmental activity, in this
case the enforcement of land use regulations, causes a transfer to a
governmental entity. When does a regulation cause such a transfer?
Only when the governmental entity holds interests, usually owner-
ship, in land that is benefited by the burden on the regulated land.
As a practical matter, the government's land must be more than just
remotely or incidentally benefited; there must be some threshold
level, such as "specially and directly benefited." An example, of
which several cases have occurred, is found when airport-approach
zoning is imposed on land lying under the flight path of aircraft land-
ing and taking off from a public airport.'4 3 Because the burden on
the zoned land specially benefits the government's property in the
airport, a "taking" occurs. One might imagine other cases in which a
governmental entity regulates private land with the effect, if not nec-
essarily the intent, of conferring a special benefit on some govern-
mentally owned land. It should not be said that there must be an
intent, though often there will be; a "taking" occurs if there is in fact
a special benefit, and so a transfer, to the governmental land.
143. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2329-31 (1971).
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The fundamental problem with Mahon's "too far" test is that it
takes into account only one side of the transfer that must occur for a
"taking." It fails to recognize the transfer element. It considers only
the owner's loss and makes a "taking" turn on the degree of loss. The
theory propounded here turns upon a principled, qualitative differ-
ence in the operation of regulations that cause or do not cause "tak-
ings." Such variation is inherent in the nature of eminent domain as
it is referred to in constitutional limitations and manifested in all
other classes of cases. Police power "takings" are thus made a part of
the general law of eminent domain.
Now the circle closes. The "taking" theory proposed would most
surely reduce to very few the number of regulations that would effect
"takings." A vital due process doctrine would be necessary to impose
a meaningful constitutional limitation upon those land use regula-
tions. The due process test previously urged provides that limitation.
With the due process test, the Supreme Court could afford to adopt
the "taking" test. A good starting point is Fred F. French Investing
Co. v. City of New York.'"
V. CONCLUSIONS
Students of the subject have long and eagerly awaited a definitive
Supreme Court decision on police power, or regulatory, "takings."
The Court's recent decision in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of
San Diego, especially Justice Brennan's dissent, and Justice Rehn-
quist's separate opinion, suggest that a majority was close to agree-
ment on what they would have regarded as a definitive position. A
"breakthrough" may be imminent. Before the justices subscribe to
Justice Brennan's formula, however, they should consider carefully
whether it would perpetuate and compound problems that, until they
are resolved, will frustrate any definitive solution.
The Brennan formula focuses upon the remedy for a regulatory
"taking." In so doing, it assumes that the test for when a "taking"
occurs is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon's "too far" test. The real
problems that for sixty years have bedeviled federal and state courts
alike swirl around this test. Mahon is seriously inconsistent with
Mugler v. Kansas and a number of other leading Supreme Court de-
cisions. The "too far" test is a replication of that part of Lawton v.




Steele's due process test that turns upon the phrase "unduly oppres-
sive." Because the phrase "too far" is vague and has not been given
detailed content, it has produced inconsistent results in the Supreme
Court and in state courts that are bound by it as constitutional law.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion adds another source of confu-
sion to these long standing problems; it calls for the remedy of com-
pensation, while Mahon's remedy is to invalidate an offending
regulation.
Before a court can choose a remedy, it must have arrived at a solid
basis for determining the right. Mahon's "too far" test appears to be
the basis for the right in Justice Brennan's dissent. It is not solid. It
is judicial quicksand in which scores or hundreds of opinions have
wallowed for years. Until the Court moves to secure the basis of the
right, there will never be a definitive decision on police power
"takings."
There is a better way. By interpreting "too far" as a "metaphor"
for lack of substantive due process, the Court will avoid many
problems associated with just compensation. Mahon will be brought
together with Lawton, where it belongs. While the Court could
hardly have taken that step a few years ago, recent events have made
it appear plausible, perhaps likely. In several areas, recent Supreme
Court decisions have given renewed force to private property rights.
Those members of the Court who, with Justice Stewart in Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp. ," believe that "the dichotomy between
personal liberties and property rights is a false one" have the oppor-
tunity to act on their belief.
If "too far" becomes a due process question, then a new regulatory
"taking" doctrine must emerge. There is a better way here, too. In
line with the general law of eminent domain and with the normal
meaning of "taken," a regulation should be a "taking" only when its
benefits specially and directly augment governmentally owned rights
in land. This is a narrow doctrine, allowing compensation in only a
few situations. But, with an enlarged role for due process, the narrow
"taking" doctrine will suffice. The two doctrines complement and
supplement each other, pieces that interlock into a rational, workable
mosaic.
This article has been written in that spirit of "quiet desperation" of
which Thoreau speaks. San Diego Gas'46 gives much evidence that
145. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
146. 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
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the Supreme Court will imminently announce a doctrine such as Jus-
tice Brennan spells out. The Court has set its face against any mean-
ingful discussion of the "problems and pitfalls" that do exist and have
skewed the "taking question" for many years. Justice Brennan passes
over them in silence. The Court has never, recently at any rate, dis-
cussed the theories of due process and "taking" offered here. Justice
Brennan passes over them by a brief dismissal of Fred F French. If a
major decision is near, let it be for the better. If the problems of the
past are cast in stone, who knows how long they may last?
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